Sea-Land Svc. v. Barry by unknown
1994 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-7-1994 
Sea-Land Svc. v. Barry 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994 
Recommended Citation 
"Sea-Land Svc. v. Barry" (1994). 1994 Decisions. 212. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/212 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1994 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
                 
 
 No. 94-3026 
                 
 
 
 SEA-LAND SERVICE, INC. 
   Petitioner 
 v. 
 
 JAMES BARRY AND DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS'  
 COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
  
                 
 
 PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE DECISION AND ORDER OF 
 THE BENEFITS REVIEW BOARD 
 BRB Docket No. 92-1238 
 
                 
 
 Argued: August 9, 1994 
 Before:  MANSMANN, COWEN and McKEE, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed:  December 7, 1994) 
                  
 
      KEITH L. FLICKER, ESQ. (ARGUED) 
      RICHARD L. GARELICK, ESQ. 
      Flicker, Garelick & Associates 
      641 Lexington Avenue 
      New York, New York 10022 
        
      Counsel for Petitioner 
 
      JAMES R. CAMPBELL, ESQ. 
      EILEEN K. CAMPBELL, ESQ. 
      109 Lafayette Street 
      Suite 807 
      New York, New York  10013 
        
        Counsel for James Barry 
 
      THOMAS S. WILLIAMSON, JR. 
      Solicitor of Labor 
      CAROL A. DE DEO 
  
      Associate Solicitor    
      JOSHUA T. GILLELAN II (ARGUED) 
      Senior Attorney 
      Office of the Solicitor 
      U.S. Department of Labor 
      S-4325 Frances Perkins Building 
      200 Constitution Avenue, N.W. 
      Washington, D.C. 20210 
 
      Counsel for the Director, OWCP 
 
                 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                 
 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
  Sea-Land Service, Inc. seeks review of an order of the 
United States Department of Labor Benefits Review Board which 
affirmed the adverse decision of an Administrative Law Judge. The 
ALJ held that Sea-Land was liable for a twenty percent penalty on 
an overdue compensation award under § 14(f) of the Longshore and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901, et seq. (1988) 
(the "Act" or the "LHWCA").  For the reasons that follow, we will 
deny the petition for review and affirm the decision of the 
Board. 
 
 I. 
  James Barry filed an occupational disease claim for 
$4,090.51 against Sea-Land under the LHWCA.  On January 2, 1991, 
Sea-Land's counsel submitted a stipulation memorializing the 
parties' settlement of Barry's claim to Administrative Law Judge 
Ralph A. Romano who was then presiding over the matter.  The ALJ 
  
approved the terms of this settlement in an Order Approving 
Settlement which was filed in the office of the district director 
on Tuesday, January 15, 1991.  On that same date the order was 
sent to the parties by certified mail. 
  On Friday, January 25, 1991, a copy of the ALJ's Order 
Approving Settlement was received in the office of Crawford & 
Company, Sea-Land's adjuster for workers' compensation claims.  
Crawford and Company made payment on Sea-Land's behalf in 
accordance with the terms of settlement by a check dated January 
30, 1991. The check was probably mailed to Barry the same day.1 
  Barry subsequently asserted that Sea-Land's payment had 
been untimely and petitioned the district director to assess a 
twenty percent penalty against Sea-Land under 33 U.S.C. § 914(f) 
("§ 14(f)" of the Act).2  The district director granted the 
request and ordered Sea-Land to pay the additional twenty percent 
penalty, which amounted to $818.10.  Sea-Land disputed Barry's 
entitlement to the penalty, and the matter was ultimately 
                     
 
    1 The ALJ made no finding on whether the check was mailed 
the same day it was drawn; the evidence showed only that it was 
Crawford & Company's usual business practice to mail such checks 
on the same day the order is received in Crawford's offices. 
     
2
 Section 14(f) of the LHWCA provides in relevant part: 
 
   If any compensation, payable under the 
terms of an award, is not paid within ten 
days after it becomes due, there shall be 
added to such unpaid compensation an amount 
equal to 20 per centum thereof, . . . unless 
review of the compensation order making such 
award is had as provided in section 921 of 
this title and an order staying payment has 
been issued by the Board or the court.  
  
referred to the Office of Administrative Law Judges for a 
hearing.  After conducting a formal hearing, ALJ Paul H. Teitler 
issued a decision and order on March 2, 1992, in which he ruled 
against Sea-Land and imposed the twenty percent penalty. 
  Sea-Land paid the penalty but appealed the ALJ's 
decision to the Board.  On December 30, 1993, the Board affirmed 
the decision and order of ALJ Teitler and modified the award to 
reflect Barry's entitlement to interest on the late penalty 
payment. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under 33 
U.S.C. § 921(c). 
 II.   
  We first address the Director's challenge to the 
Board's jurisdiction, and thus to our jurisdiction to review the 
Board's order.  Section 921(b)(3) of the Act provides that “[t]he 
Board shall be authorized to hear and determine appeals raising a 
substantial question of law or fact taken by any party in 
interest from decisions with respect to claims of employees under 
this chapter . . . .” Once the Board has rendered a decision, 
“[a]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order of 
the Board may obtain a review of that order in the United States 
court of appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred . . 
. .” 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). 
  The Director contends that the order imposing a penalty 
under § 14(f) is a "supplementary order declaring the amount of 
the default" under § 18(a).  Section 18(a) provides in part as 
follows: 
  
 In case of default by the employer in 
the payment of compensation due under any 
award of compensation . . . the person to 
whom such compensation is payable may . . . 
make application to the deputy commissioner 
making the compensation order [f]or a 
supplementary order declaring the amount of 
the default. . . . The applicant may file a 
certified copy of such supplementary order 
with the clerk of the Federal district court 
. . . .  Such supplementary order of the 
deputy commissioner shall be final, and the 
court shall upon the filing of the copy enter 
judgment for the amount declared in default 
by the supplementary order . . . .  Review of 
the judgment so entered may be had as in 
civil suits for damages at common law. 
 
33 U.S.C. §  918(a) (1988).  The Director argues that such an 
order is enforceable in district court proceedings but that such 
enforcement is outside the review jurisdiction of the Board.   
  In essence, the Director maintains that payment under a 
§ 18(a) order without initiating enforcement proceedings in the 
district court constitutes a waiver of any objection to the 
validity of the § 18(a) award.  Thus, the Director urges that, 
rather than paying the § 14(f) penalty, Sea-Land should have 
refused to pay and thereby compelled the Director to enforce the 
order in a district court enforcement proceeding.  We disagree.  
  The Director's logic would require an employer to 
deliberately withhold payment to a claimant in order to force 
litigation in a district court. The claimant would then have to 
await the outcome of that litigation before receiving his or her 
payment.  This result is inconsistent with the underlying 
compensatory philosophy of the Act.  The LHWCA seeks to protect 
claimants and provide effective and expeditious compensation to 
  
those who are entitled to it.  See Strachan Shipping Co. v. 
Hollis, 460 F.2d 1108, 1114 & n.9 (1972).   
  It would be counterproductive for us to conclude that 
an employer who disagrees with a compensation order must withhold 
payment thereby forcing the claimant to initiate enforcement 
proceedings in order to have the validity of the award reviewed.  
The purpose of the Act is to place the compensation award in the 
hands of the entitled claimant as soon as possible.  See id.; 
Arrow Stevedore Co. v. Pillsbury, 12 F. Supp. 920, 922 (N.D. Cal. 
1935); aff'd, 88 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1937).  The Act's provision 
regarding enforcement proceedings applies only "[i]f an[] 
employer . . . fails to comply with a compensation order."  33 
U.S.C. §  921(d).  The Act provides in relevant part as follows: 
 If any employer or his [or her] officers 
or agents fails to comply with a compensation 
order making an award, that has become final, 
any beneficiary of such award or the 
[district director]3 making the order, may 
apply for the enforcement of the order to the 
Federal district court for the judicial 
district in which the injury occurred. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  The decision of the district court can 
then be appealed to the appropriate court of appeals, thereby 
giving two levels of appeal.  However, when an employer pays the 
§ 14(f) penalty in accordance with the objectives of the statute, 
but disputes the validity of that award, there is no need for an 
                     
 
3
 Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 702.105, the term "district director" 
has been substituted for the term "deputy commissioner" which is 
used in the statute.  
  
enforcement action in a district court, and the language of the 
statute does not provide for one in that instance.   
  Once the award has been paid, review is not available 
(and is not warranted) in a district court enforcement 
proceeding.  Thus, we must conclude that Congress intended to 
provide that an aggrieved party could pay a penalty under § 14(f) 
and then challenge the propriety of the assessment of that 
penalty in a proceeding brought before the Benefits Review Board. 
Section 921(c) then allows the aggrieved party to appeal the 
Board's decision to the appropriate court of appeals.  
Accordingly, the Board properly held that it had jurisdiction to 
decide this appeal from the decision of the ALJ.  
  III. 
  The central issues in this case involve the application 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the LHWCA.  Rule 
81(a)(6) provides that the Rules apply to "proceedings for 
enforcement or review of compensation orders" under the LHWCA (§§ 
18 and 21 of the Act).4  Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(6).  That Rule is 
not, however, intended to extend the scope of the Rules beyond 
their intended application to "procedure in the United States 
district courts in all suits of a civil nature."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
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 "Although § 914 is not mentioned specifically in Rule 
81(a)(6) . . . [an order based upon] `a "Section 14(f) 
assessment" . . . [is] a "supplementary order declaring the 
amount of the default" within the meaning of Section 18(a) of the 
LHWCA.'"  Quave v. Progress Marine, 912 F.2d 798, 800 (5th Cir. 
1990), cert. denied,     U.S.    , 111 S. Ct. 2012 (1991) 
(quoting Lauzon v. Strachan Shipping Co., 782 F.2d 1217, 1219 
(5th Cir. 1985)). 
  
1.  Payment of the award at issue here did not involve a 
"procedure in the United States district courts" and the Director 
therefore argues that the Rules do not apply to the computation 
of timeliness for such payment.  However, we need not decide the 
issue of the general applicability of the Rules to the instant 
penalty assessment because, assuming arguendo that the Rules do 
apply, Sea-Land still cannot prevail.  
 A. 
  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) provides in 
pertinent part: 
 In computing any period of time 
prescribed . . . by these rules . . . the day 
of the act . . . from which the designated 
period of time begins to run shall not be 
included.  The last day of the period so 
computed shall be included, unless it is a 
Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday . . . in 
which event the period runs until the end of 
the next day which is not one of the 
aforementioned days.  When the period of time 
prescribed or allowed is less than 11 days, 
intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal 
holidays shall be excluded in the 
computation. 
 
Rule 6(a) would require that five days be excluded from the 
computation of timeliness.5  Accordingly, if Rule 6(a) applies, 
Sea-Land would have mailed payment on the tenth day.  Sea-Land 
further asserts that it should be afforded an additional 3 days 
                     
     
5
 There were five days falling either on a weekend or on a 
holiday (Martin Luther King's Birthday) between Tuesday, January 
15, 1991 (the date the Order Approving Settlement was filed in 
the office of the district director) and Wednesday, January 30, 
1991 (the date Crawford & Company issued the compensation check).  
  
to pay Barry under Rule 6(e) and that its payment was, therefore, 
timely.  
  Rule 6(e) provides: 
  Whenever a party has the right or is required 
to do some act or take some proceedings 
within a prescribed period after the service 
of a notice or other paper upon the party and 
the notice or paper is served upon the party 
by mail, 3 days shall be added to the 
prescribed period. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e) (emphasis added).  Thus, if Rule 6(e) 
applies, Sea-Land would be allowed an additional 3 days for 
delivery of the check to Barry.  We conclude, however, that Rule 
6(e) does not apply. 
 B. 
  Rule 6(e) is triggered by the requirement of "service 
of a notice or other paper."  There is no such condition in the 
LHWCA.  Section 14(f) of the Act requires that a 20 percent 
penalty be added if compensation is not paid within "ten days 
after it becomes due" (emphasis added).  A compensation order 
becomes "due" or "effective when filed in the office of the 
deputy commissioner."  33 U.S.C. §  921(a).  See also Lauzon v. 
Strachan Shipping Co. 782 F.2d 1217, 1220 (5th Cir. 1985) ("`The 
term `effective' in § 921(a) is equivalent to the terms `due' and 
`due and payable' in §§ 914(f) and 918(a), respectively.'  
Consequently the time for payment started running when the award 
was filed, and not when [the employer] was served.") (citation 
omitted).  The Board correctly surmised the relevant distinction 
between the language in Rule 6(e) and the requirements of § 
  
14(f).  Citing the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Lauzon, the Board 
stated that "Rule 6(e) is inapplicable in cases involving Section 
14(f) as it requires an action to occur within 10 days of filing 
and not 10 days of service as contemplated by Rule 6(e)."  Barry 
v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 27 BRBS at 263. 
  Sea-Land claims that the Board erred in not considering 
that the compensation order must be served on the claimant and 
the employer before it is "filed" under § 19(e) of the LHWCA.  In 
essence, Sea-Land argues that the filing, and the service of a 
compensation order, are inseparable.  This interpretation is 
strained as it is contrary to the plain meaning of § 19(e).  See 
Bethlehem Steel v. OSHA, 573 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1978) (a 
statute cannot be interpreted in a manner that strains "the plain 
and natural meaning of words").  The Act does not define "filing" 
but it is clear that filing and mailing are two distinct 
procedures, and that service is not necessary to trigger the ten 
day payment period.   
  Our analysis is further illuminated by the language of 
the regulation implementing § 19(e). That regulation provides 
that upon receipt of a compensation order from an administrative 
law judge, 
 the district director . . . shall formally date and 
file the transcript, pleadings, and compensation order 
(original) in his [or her] office.  Such filing shall 
be accomplished by the close of business on the next 
succeeding working day, and the district director 
shall, on the same day as the filing was accomplished, 
send by certified mail a copy of the compensation order 
to the parties and to representatives of the parties, 
if any. 
  
20 C.F.R. § 702.349 (1994) (emphasis added).  Thus, although the 
order must be mailed on the same day that it is filed, the act of 
filing the order is what triggers the employer's duty to make 
payment in accordance with the order.   
  This interpretation is consistent with that of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Jeffboat, Inc. v. 
Mann, 875 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1989).  In a similar situation, the 
court in Jeffboat ruled that the thirty-day period for filing an 
appeal under § 21(a) began to run on the date the judge's order 
was filed in the office of the deputy commissioner; not on the 
date copies of the order were mailed to the parties.  Id. at 664.  
Specifically, the court stated "we hold that the Deputy 
Commissioner’s failure to mail a copy of the ALJ’s order to 
Jeffboat’s counsel did not prevent the order from being ‘filed’ 
and becoming effective, and thus [the employer’s] notice of 
appeal from that order was untimely.” Id.  The court noted that 
"the language of [20 C.F.R. §  702.349] does not make proper 
mailing part of filing: the regulation mandates that the copies 
be sent `on the same day as the filing was accomplished'; if 
filing is not complete until copies are mailed to the parties' 
representatives, the distinction would make no sense."  Id. at 
663.  We agree. 
  Rule 6(e) does not apply and Sea-Land’s payment, 
(though arguably mailed on the tenth day under Rule 6 (a)) was 
nevertheless not timely unless Sea-Land “paid” Barry when the 
check was mailed, and not when it was received by Barry. 
 IV. 
  
  Sea-Land argues that compensation under the Act is 
"paid" when the check is mailed not when it is received by the 
claimant, and that we must reject the Board's ruling to the 
contrary.  We have previously stated that "`[p]ayment on a check 
that is not post-dated is effective as of the date the check is 
delivered,"  Staff Builders, Inc. v. Koschitzki, 989 F.2d 692, 
695 (3d Cir. 1993). 
  Although we have not previously addressed this issue 
directly, our determination that the “receipt rule” determines 
when a claimant is “paid” under § 14(f) is consistent with prior 
rulings of the Board. “[W]e note that the Board has previously 
considered and rejected employer’s argument that payment should 
be considered to have been made on the date the check was placed 
in the mail instead of the date claimant received the check.” 
Matthews v. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 22 BRBS 
440, 442 (1989) (citing McKamie v. Transworld Drilling Co., 7 
BRBS 315 (1978)).  Although we are not bound by decisions of the 
Board, they are nevertheless helpful to our present analysis. 
  Our analysis is also consistent with the general common 
law principle that "[p]ayment is not effectuated by sending the 
amount due to the creditor by mail or other public carrier until 
the remittance gets into the hands of the creditor."  70 C.J.S. 
Payment § 9 (1987) (footnotes omitted).  As previously noted, 
Sea-Land did not mail Barry's check until January 30, 1991, which 
was the last possible date for payment if Rule 6(a) applies.  We 
assume (as did the Board) that the payment was not received on 
  
the same day it was mailed.  Accordingly, it was received beyond 
the tenth day and was therefore not timely.6 
  We are not unsympathetic to Sea-Land’s assertion of the 
unfair and often impractical results of penalizing an employer 
for circumstances which may be well beyond the employer's 
control.  We agree that the "receipt rule" could "be impractical 
and inequitable by very often placing employers in positions 
where they would be exposed to the Section 14(f) penalty through 
absolutely no fault of their own."  Petitioner's Brief at 13.  
Indeed, this case is just such an example as Barry's check was 
apparently mailed on the same day that Crawford received the 
order for payment.  
  Such equitable complaints are not new, and although we 
are sympathetic, we are bound by the statute before us.  
Moreover, similar complaints about the inequities of the "receipt 
rule" have been rejected by other courts of appeals.  In Lauzon, 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit responded to such 
complaints by stating "that section 914(f) does not admit to an 
exception for late payment for equitable reasons." Lauzon, 782 
                     
6
 Our definition of “payment” is also informed by the New York 
decisions construing that term because the compensation award was 
mailed to Barry at his New York address.  See South American 
Petrol. Corp. v. Columbian Petrol. Co., 31 N.Y.S.2d 771, 773-74 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941).  Under New York law, a check is not 
considered absolute payment until it is honored by the drawee 
bank.  Demerritt v. Levitt, 419 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320 (N.Y. App. 
Div.) appeal denied 423 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1979).   
 Once a check has been paid by the drawee bank, the date of 
payment for purposes of timeliness relates back to the date the 
check was received by the payee, not the date of mailing.  Duke 
v. Sun Oil Co., 320 F.2d 853, 861 (5th Cir. 1963).  
  
F.2d at 12227 .  The court held that the twenty-percent penalty 
of § 914(f) is "self-executing" and automatically becomes due 
upon the expiration of the ten-day period.  In essence, it is a 
non-discretionary penalty that applies in every instance in which 
payment is overdue.  See id.  See also Providence Washington Ins. 
Co. v. Director, OWCP, 765 F.2d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir. 1985). 
  It is by now axiomatic that "the judiciary may not sit 
as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of 
legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither 
affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines."  City 
of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).  Absent 
ambiguity in the statute, we cannot allow policy to guide our 
analysis.  See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (the first step in 
judicial statutory construction is always to look at the text of 
the statute and to stop there if the text reveals the 
"unambiguously expressed intent of Congress").  We are not at 
liberty to ignore the unambiguous mandate of this statute, nor 
are we free to re-evaluate the relative burdens and benefits of a 
balance that Congress has struck.  See Long Island Oil Products 
Co. v. Local 553 Pension Fund, 775 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1985).  
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 In Lauzon, the employer prepared the claimant’s check on 
time and held the check at the employer’s office as an 
accommodation to the claimant. When claimant failed to pick up 
the check the employer called the claimant and left a message 
with claimant’s wife. However, she forgot to tell claimant that 
the check was ready. When the employer called back, yet again, 
and offered to hand deliver the check the ten day period had 
expired, and the claimant instructed his wife not to accept the 
payment. 
  
Sea-Land has justifiable complaints and fairly expresses the 
inequities and problems built into this statute, but those 
complaints must be addressed to Congress and not the courts. 
  More than ten days lapsed between the date payment 
became due on January 15, 1991 and the date payment was received 
by Barry.  Thus, the Board's decision affirming the imposition of 
the penalty was proper. 
 V. 
  Finally, Sea-Land contests the Board's decision to 
award Barry post-judgment interest.  Sea-Land argues that there 
is no express statutory authority for an award of interest on 
overdue compensation.  The Director counters that the Act should 
be construed to allow interest awards on overdue compensation and 
urges us to affirm the Board's decision which relied upon the 
ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
Foundation Constructors, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 950 F.2d 621 
(9th Cir. 1991).  There, the court held that where substantial 
evidence exists to support a finding that a claimant was injured 
and was entitled to disability compensation under the LHWCA, and 
the employer did not timely pay the disability compensation, 
interest accrued on the overdue compensation.  Id. at 625.  We 
are in agreement with the following reasoning of the court in 
Foundation Constructors: 
  It is a truism that a dollar tomorrow is not 
worth as much as a dollar today.  Allowing an 
employer to delay compensation payments 
interest-free would reduce the worth of such 
payments to the claimant, undermining the 
remedial intent of the Act.  We believe that 
the Director's construction that interest may 
  
be required on past-due compensation is 
reasonable and consistent with the ends of 
the Act. 
Id.  See also Quave v. Progress Marine, 912 F.2d 798, 801 (5th 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied,     U.S.    , 111 S. Ct. 2012 (1991); 
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v. Director, OWCP, 594 F.2d 
986, 987 (4th Cir. 1979).  Accordingly, we uphold the Board's 
award of interest to Barry. 
 
 VI.  
  For the reasons stated above, we will deny the petition 
for review of the Board's decision. In doing so, however, we can 
only hope that Congress will address the problems built into this 
statute.  AFFIRMED. 
